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1. Introduction 
Under Project Prometheus, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
investigated deep space missions that would utilize space nuclear power systems (SNPSs) to 
provide energy for propulsion and spacecraft power. The initial study involved the Jupiter 
Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO), which was proposed to conduct in-depth studies of three Jovian 
moons. Current radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) and solar power systems 
cannot meet expected mission power demands, which include propulsion, scientific 
instrument packages, and communications. Historically, RTGs have provided long-lived, 
highly reliable, low-power-level systems. Solar power systems can provide much greater 
levels of power, but power density levels decrease dramatically at ~1.5 astronomical units 
(AU) and beyond. Alternatively, an SNPS can supply high-sustained power for space 
applications that is both reliable and mass efficient.  
Terrestrial nuclear reactors employ varying degrees of human control and decision-making 
for operations and benefit from periodic human interaction for maintenance. In contrast, the 
control system of an SNPS must be able to provide continuous operation for the mission 
duration with limited immediate human interaction and no opportunity for hardware 
maintenance or sensor calibration. In effect, the SNPS control system must be able to 
independently operate the power plant while maintaining power production even when 
subject to off-normal events and component failure. This capability is critical because it will 
not be possible to rely upon continuous, immediate human interaction for control due to 
communications delays and periods of planetary occlusion. In addition, uncertainties, rare 
events, and component degradation combine with the aforementioned inaccessibility and 
unattended operation to pose unique challenges that an SNPS control system must 
accommodate. Autonomous control is needed to address these challenges and optimize the 
reactor control design. 
1.1 State of the technology 
To support JIMO development, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the University 
of Tennessee (UT) conducted an investigation of autonomous control. Overviews of 
autonomous control characteristics, capabilities, and applications were found that establish 
the existing experience and current technology readiness (Antsaklis & Passino, 1992; 
Astrom, 1989; Chaudhuri et al., 1996; Passino, 1995; Zeigler & Chi, 1992; Basher & Neal, 
2003). The desirable characteristics of autonomous control include intelligence, robustness, 
optimization, flexibility, adaptability, and reliability. 
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Control systems with varying levels of autonomy have been employed in robotic, 
transportation, spacecraft, and manufacturing applications. However, autonomous control 
has not been implemented for an operating terrestrial nuclear power plant, and there  
has not been any experience beyond automating simple control loops for space reactors. 
Current automated control technologies for nuclear power plants are reasonably mature, 
and basic control for an SNPS is clearly feasible under optimum circumstances. 
Autonomous control is primarily intended to account for non-optimum circumstances when 
degradation, failure, and other off-normal events challenge the performance of the reactor, 
and near-term human intervention is not possible. There are clear gaps in the development 
and demonstration of autonomous control capabilities for the specific domain of nuclear 
power operations.  
1.2 Advanced control in nuclear power applications 
In the nuclear power industry, single-input, single-output classical control has been the 
primary means of automating individual control loops. The use of multivariate control, such 
as three element controllers for steam generators, has been employed in some cases. In a few 
cases, efforts were made to coordinate the action of individual control loops, based on an 
overall control goal, and extend the range of automated control.  
The application of most advanced techniques for nuclear power control has primarily been 
the domain of universities and national laboratories. Some of the techniques employed in 
controls research for both power and research reactors include adaptive robust control for 
the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II), fuzzy logic control for power transition, H-
infinity control and genetic-algorithm based control for steam generators, neural network 
control for power distribution in a reactor core, and supervisory control for the multi-
modular advanced liquid-metal reactor (ALMR). Proceedings of past American Nuclear 
Society (ANS) International Topical Meetings on Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Control 
and Human-Machine Interface Technologies provide a useful compendium of findings from 
such research activities (ANS, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2010). In recent research for 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), UT demonstrated aspects of near-autonomy for a 
representative SNPS design through the development of a model-predictive controller using 
a simulation of the SP-100 reactor system (Upadhyaya et al., 2007; Na & Upadhyaya, 2007). 
The approach demonstrated the fault-tolerance and reconfiguration features of the control 
strategy. 
1.3 Autonomy in space exploration 
NASA has pursued autonomy for spacecraft and surface exploration vehicles (e.g., rovers) 
to reduce mission costs, increase efficiency for communications between ground control and 
the vehicle, and enable independent operation of the vehicle during times of 
communications blackout. For rovers, functional autonomy addresses navigation, target 
identification, and science package manipulation. For spacecraft, functional autonomy has 
focused on automated guidance, navigation, and control. 
Autonomy for rovers has progressed during the last decade with prominent examples from 
efforts to explore the surface of Mars. The Mars Pathfinder rover, Sojourner, explored the 
Martian terrain beginning in July 1997 (Mishkin et al., 1998). The Sojourner had very limited 
autonomy to enable navigation and provide for resource management and contingency 
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response. Because it only provided supervised autonomy, repetitive ground monitoring was 
required. In January 2004, Spirit and Opportunity, the twin Mars Exploration Rovers 
(MERs), began a surface exploration mission that has continued into 2011. These rovers 
employ expanded autonomy over what was feasible for Sojourner and provide model-based 
recovery, resource management, and autonomous planning capabilities in addition to 
autonomous obstacle detection and navigation. The integration software architecture used 
to facilitate MER autonomy is the “Coupled Layer Architecture for Robotic Autonomy” or 
CLARAty (Volpe et al., 2001). CLARAty provides a dual-layer architecture consisting of a 
decision layer for artificial intelligence (AI) software and a functional layer for controls 
implementations. Implicit granularity in each layer allows for a functional hierarchy with 
nested capabilities.  
Spacecraft autonomy has been demonstrated with the Deep Space 1 mission. Deep Space 1 
was launched in October 1998 as a test platform to validate high-risk advanced technologies 
in space (Rayman et al., 1999). In support of autonomous navigation of the spacecraft, a 
principal experiment involved demonstration of the remote agent (RA) AI system for on-
board planning and execution of spacecraft activities.  
2. Autonomous control functional definition 
2.1 The nature of autonomy 
There is a distinction between automated control and autonomous control. Consideration  
of the Greek root words illustrates the difference. Automatos means self-acting, while 
autonomos means independent. Similarly, automated control involves self-action, while 
autonomous control involves independent action. Autonomous control implies an 
embedded intelligence. Although automation includes at least a limited inherent authority 
within the control system, automated control often consists of straightforward automatic 
execution of repetitive basic actions. It is clear that autonomous control encompasses 
automated control.  
Automated control provides control actions that result from a fixed set of algorithms with 
typically limited global state determination. As a result, automated control is often 
implemented as rigidly defined individual control loops rather than as fully integrated 
process/plant control. Although automated control requires no real-time operator action for 
normal operational events, most significant decision-making is left to the human rather than 
being incorporated as part of the control system. In contrast, autonomous control integrates 
control, diagnostic, and decision capabilities. A flexible functional architecture provides the 
capability to adapt to evolving conditions and operational constraints and even support self-
maintenance over the control system lifetime. While automated control is common in 
numerous applications, autonomous control is more difficult to achieve, and the experience 
base is very limited.  
Autonomy extends the scope of primary control functions. Such capabilities can consist of 
automated control during all operating modes, process performance optimization (for 
example, self-tuning), continuous monitoring, and diagnosis of performance indicators as 
well as trends for operational and safety-related parameters, diagnosis of component health, 
flexible control to address both anticipated and unanticipated events and to provide 
protection of life-limited components (such as batteries and actuators), adaptation to 
changing or degrading conditions, and validation and maintenance of control system 
performance. 
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Key characteristics of autonomy include intelligence, robustness, optimization, flexibility, and 
adaptability. Intelligence facilitates minimal or no reliance on human intervention and can 
accommodate an integrated, whole system approach to control. It implies embedded decision-
making and management/planning authority. Intelligence in control provides for anticipatory 
action based on system knowledge and event prediction. To support control and decision, 
real-time diagnostic/prognostic capabilities are important for state identification and 
health/condition monitoring. Additionally, self-validation is an aspect of intelligence that 
addresses data, command, and system performance assessment and response. 
In addition to providing an environmentally rugged implementation, robustness is addressed 
by accounting for design uncertainties and unmodeled dynamics. Fault management is an 
important consideration in achieving robustness. Fault management involves techniques such 
as fault avoidance, fault removal, fault tolerance, and fault forecasting. Robustness can also 
involve self-maintenance or self-healing. This capability is promoted through means such as 
captured design knowledge and self-correcting features, prognostics to identify incipient 
failure, and fault detection and isolation. 
Optimization implies rapid response to demands, minimal deviation from target conditions, 
and efficient actuator actions. Optimized control can be facilitated by self-tuning and other 
forms of adaptation. Flexibility and adaptability are enabled by diverse measurements, 
multiple communication options, and alternate control solutions. Functional reconfigurability 
facilitates the effective use of these systems options, while an inherent redesign capability 
permits adaptation to unanticipated conditions. 
The characteristics discussed above represent the possibilities of autonomy, but they do not 
constitute a necessary set. Therefore, autonomous control can be viewed as providing a 
spectrum of capabilities with automated control representing the lowest extreme or baseline 
of the continuum. The incorporation of increasing intelligence and fault tolerance moves the 
control capabilities further along the spectrum. The higher degrees of autonomy are 
characterized by greater fault management, more embedded planning and goal setting, and 
even self-healing. The realization of full autonomy involves learning, evolving, and 
strategizing independent of human interaction or supervision. 
2.2 Space nuclear power mission challenges 
The space reactor control and protection paradigm is different from conventional terrestrial 
reactor applications. Terrestrial reactors have relied upon immediate interaction from 
readily available human resources. This includes varying degrees of direct human control 
and decision-making for operations and periodic human intervention for maintenance and 
refurbishment. In contrast, the SNPS control system must be able to provide continuous, 
remote, often-unattended operation for a mission lasting up to a decade or more. Because of 
communication delays and blackouts, immediate human interaction for continuous 
operational supervision and event management is not feasible. This isolation drives the need 
for a high level of autonomy. Because of launch considerations, size and mass constraints 
significantly limit the options for redundancy and diverse systems. This limitation drives 
the need for functional and environmental robustness. Because of distance from the Earth 
for deep space or planetary surface power applications, maintenance and refurbishment are 
improbable if not impossible. This inaccessibility drives the need for long-life dependability. 
Also, because of the critical and time-sensitive nature of some spacecraft maneuvers, space 
reactor power must be available on demand. This operational imperative, coupled with the 
likelihood that an SNPS restart capability will be unavailable, requires that reactor scrams as 
www.intechopen.com
 
An Approach to Autonomous Control for Space Nuclear Power Systems 
 
105 
a response to plant events must be minimized if not completely avoided. Thus, unlike the 
design criteria for terrestrial nuclear power plants, mission assurance must be emphasized 
over reactor protection for space reactors. 
Automated control can provide the necessary automation of normal operational control to 
permit ground control personnel to assume a supervisory role for an SNPS rather than 
taking on direct, active control responsibilities. This control capability for full-power range 
maneuverability, including startup, has been developed and demonstrated for terrestrial 
reactors (Winks et al., 1992). However, considering the challenges of a deep space mission, 
the SNPS control system must do more than provide automated control of normal 
operational activities. In addition to automation, the control system must provide a level of 
autonomy that can detect, diagnose, and adapt to evolving conditions (e.g., failures or 
degradation) as well as rapidly respond to anticipated events without requiring a reactor 
scram. As a result, autonomous control is clearly necessary to ensure the successful 
application of an SNPS for deep space missions. This conclusion is based on the 
understanding that autonomous capabilities permit the SNPS control system to satisfy 
essential control objectives under significant uncertainties, disturbances, and degradation 
without requiring any human intervention. In a sense, the role of the autonomous control 
system is to act as an extension of and occasional proxy for the ground-based human 
operators to ensure reliable, continuous operation of an SNPS over an extended lifetime 
under adverse conditions.  
2.3 Space Nuclear Power System control 
Autonomous control functions of an SNPS can be defined based on the expected operational 
modes, which include startup, normal power operation, reactor protection, contingent 
operation, and end-of-mission shutdown. As a minimum requirement of autonomy, the 
SNPS control system must be able to switch between normal operational modes 
automatically (i.e., automated control). Additionally, reactor protective action must be 
available if the desired operational conditions cannot be achieved.  
The phases of power operation include power ascension, steady state power and load 
following, and power reduction. Under normal conditions, power operation can be 
relatively simple, with inherent feedback effects serving to maintain stability and provide 
the means for load following in response to minor fluctuations. Thermal load transients 
(e.g., turbine failure) can be treated as off-normal events. Other off-normal events include 
design uncertainties, load/power interruptions, control element jamming, control motor 
burnout, control linkage failure, unintended control element motion, actuator signal 
interruption or interference, heat rejection system degradation or damage, control processor 
fault, rare-event software error, sensor failure, sensor signal interruption or interference, 
sensor drift, signal conditioning electronics drift, sensor noise increase, and communication 
failures or retransmissions. The most likely protective action would consist of a rapid power 
runback. Contingent operation occurs when SNPS operation may be restricted either 
because of environmental limitations, such as an abnormal thermal environment, or because 
of power system limitations, such as component failures. 
The response to off-normal events is where autonomy becomes especially relevant. The 
autonomous response includes a reflexive element and a deliberative element. The first 
element addresses reactor protection. Unlike terrestrial reactors, in which the primary 
defense against potentially adverse conditions resulting from off-normal events is to 
scram the reactor, it is quite likely that an SNPS must not shut down until the end of the 
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mission because a restart capability may not be feasible. Thus, reactor protection  
is provided through diversity and defense-in-depth to anticipate potential challenges to 
power operation. A limitation system is one means of protecting the reactor. This is 
accomplished by defining acceptable operational regimes and overriding control actions 
that would drive the reactor conditions to violate the limitation boundaries. In effect, the 
limitation system acts as a bounding system whose primary purpose is to provide a check 
against operations outside of analyzed conditions. The principal response of the limitation 
system would be to run back the reactor power to assume a safe low-power condition 
when necessary. Because of the operational imperative that power must remain available 
during critical spacecraft actions for deep space missions, the SNPS control system must 
provide the capability to switch out the protection element (or at least expand  
the operational boundaries it maintains) on demand from the spacecraft or mission 
control. 
The second element of the response to off-normal events addresses mission assurance. The 
deliberative nature (i.e., determination and decision) of this element contributes the most 
relevant attribute of autonomous control that distinguishes it from conventional 
automation. In the operational control context, the autonomous control functionality 
involves detection and immediate response to degraded or failure conditions. Fault 
management is a crucial part of this element of autonomous control; it provides for 
detection, diagnosis, and adaptation (or reconfiguration) given changing SNPS conditions. 
An additional aspect of the deliberative element is the monitoring, diagnosis, and validation 
of control system and SNPS performance. Through this capability, the SNPS control system 
is able to identify incipient events (transients or failures) for anticipatory rather than 
reactionary action, determine measures to protect life-limited or vulnerable components, 
and ensure continued dependable operation of the power plant. 
As noted, the SNPS autonomous control functionality revolves around automated control 
for normal operational modes. In essence, the primary function of the control system is 
command generation to achieve the desired operational state. Additional functionality to 
support confirmation of control system performance includes features such as command 
verification, control coordination with interconnected systems, and strategy enforcement. 
Mechanisms for implementing these features can involve multiple diverse algorithms for 
comparison with the principal controller command, inclusion of feedforward action or some 
representation of unmodeled dynamics (e.g., exogenous variables) in control algorithms, 
event management according to predetermined sequences of events, and adaptation of the 
control strategy. 
Performance management as part of the SNPS autonomous control functionality involves 
continuously assessing the condition of the control system and the SNPS to identify when 
predetermined adjustments to the controller should be invoked. The needed assessments 
include monitoring control system effectiveness, identifying the dynamic state of the SNPS, 
and determining the condition of key components. Methods that can be employed are state 
estimation algorithms, process system diagnostics, component condition monitoring, and 
control parameter adaptation. 
Data management and communications are related capabilities with traditional and 
autonomous functionality intended to support autonomy and system integration. Data 
acquisition and signal processing methods provide the data needed for control and 
monitoring, while signal validation adds information about data quality. For 
communications, the functional elements include device-level data and control signals, 
www.intechopen.com
 
An Approach to Autonomous Control for Space Nuclear Power Systems 
 
107 
system-level information and commands, and spacecraft-level status and demands. The 
effective integration of data and information at each level requires a well-defined functional 
architecture with a capable physical infrastructure that supports reliable, timely information 
flow. 
Desired functionality for fault management includes detection and identification of field 
device faults, change tracking for system parameters, detection of off-normal transients and 
identification of anticipated events, and configuration control. Field device monitoring can 
be accomplished through model-based and/or data-driven algorithms. Parameter tracking 
can involve empirical models or first principles estimation. Each capability can be used to 
facilitate an adjustable system dynamic model that can be used for fault prediction or 
control system performance validation. Configuration control functions are needed to 
manage transitions among predefined control strategies or algorithms for the autonomous 
control system. This is essential for effective fault recovery. 
To illustrate the autonomous functionality that can be provided for the SNPS control 
system, two fault management scenarios are considered in which detection and response are 
described. The first scenario relates to fault adaptation in the case of sensor failure. The 
indicators from surveillance and diagnostic functions that the SNPS control system can 
employ include divergence of redundant measurements, conflict between predicted (based 
on analytical or relational estimation) and measured values, and detection and isolation of a 
confirmed fault. The prospective response can include substitution of a redundant 
measurement or utilization of a diverse measurement. An example of the latter would be 
using neutron flux instead of temperature (i.e., core thermal power) as a power 
measurement. Switching to an alternate control algorithm may prove necessary for faulted 
or suspect measurements.  
The second scenario relates to fault avoidance in the case of a degrading actuator. The 
indicators of an incipient failure can be prediction of actuator failure based on prognostic 
modeling (e.g., fault forecasting) or detection of sluggish response to commands. The 
prospective response can be to switch to an alternate control strategy to avoid incipient 
failure by reducing stress on the suspect component. An example would be utilizing 
manipulation of core heat removal (e.g., coolant density change) instead of direct reactivity 
insertion (e.g., control element movement) to control reactor power. 
2.4 Enabling autonomous control 
Autonomous control must be addressed early in the design of an SNPS to determine the 
degree of autonomy required. Mission requirements, technology readiness, design trade-
offs, and resource constraints will affect the autonomous capabilities to be included. The 
extent to which the key characteristics of autonomy are realized depends on the level of 
responsibility that is to be entrusted to the autonomous control system and the degree of 
mission risk that the autonomous control system must mitigate.  
Several factors can influence the degree of autonomy selected for an SNPS control system. 
These factors include the potential for human interaction (which is physically limited but 
also may be practically limited due to the economics of maintaining a ground-based team), 
performance goals, complexity of system demands, technological constraints, mission risk 
considerations, and the balance between simplicity (i.e., reliability) and complexity (i.e., the 
capacity to detect and adapt). The trade-off between reliability and mission assurance 
profoundly affects the level of autonomy employed for SNPS control. While having a highly 
reliable SNPS control system is important, that fact is meaningless if it cannot accommodate 
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SNPS degradation. In such a case, the result is a highly reliable control system that becomes 
useless because the plant has changed.  
Finally, as previously described, the experience base for autonomous control is not deep. In 
particular, autonomous control has not been implemented for an operating terrestrial 
nuclear power plant. The technology gaps indicated by investigation of the state of the 
technology for reactor control in general and autonomous control in particular suggest 
research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) activities that need to be accomplished 
to fully realize the goal of autonomous control for an SNPS. Key elements of the needed 
RD&D effort involve establishing a suitable functional architecture, developing 
foundational modules to support autonomy, and demonstrating the integrated application 
of autonomous capabilities.  
3. Functional architecture for autonomous control 
3.1 Architectural approaches 
As observed from examples of autonomous control for nuclear and space applications, the 
principal functional architectures that have been employed, in most cases, involve some 
form of hierarchical framework with varying distributions of intelligence. 
A three-level hierarchy is typical for robotic applications (Antsaklis & Passino, 1992; Alami 
et al., 1998; Gat, 1998). The general concept of the hierarchy is that commands are issued by 
higher levels to lower levels, and response data flows from lower levels to higher levels in 
the multi-tiered framework. Intelligence increases with increasing level within the 
hierarchy. Each of the three interacting tiers has a principal role. Basically the functional 
layer provides direct control, the executive layer provides sequencing of action, and the 
planner layer provides deliberative planning. 
As previously described, an autonomous control architecture, based on the CLARAty 
software environment, was developed to support the MER mission. The CLARAty dual-
layer architecture provides an upper (decision) layer for AI software and a lower 
(functional) layer for controls implementations. The development of CLARAty addresses 
perceived issues with the three-tiered architecture (Volpe et al., 2001). Those issues are the 
tendency toward a dominant level that depends on the expertise of the developer, the lack 
of access from the deliberative or planner level to the control or functional level, and the 
difficulty in representing the internal hierarchy of each level (e.g., nested subsystems, trees 
of logic, and multiple time lines and planning horizons) using this representation. In one 
sense, the CLARAty architecture collapses the planner and executive levels, which are 
characterized by high levels of intelligence, into the decision layer. Essentially, the 
deliberative and procedural functionalities are merged into an architectural layer that 
parallels the functional layer and provides a common database to support decision-making. 
Additionally, a system granularity dimension is maintained to explicitly represent the 
system hierarchies of the functional layer and the multiple planning horizons of the decision 
layer. 
The functional layer is an object-oriented hierarchy that provides access to the capabilities of 
the plant/system hardware and serves as the interface for the decision layer to the subject 
(robot, spacecraft, plant) under control. The interaction between the two layers depends on 
the relative granularity of each layer at the interface. At lower granularity, the decision layer 
has almost direct access to the basic capabilities of the plant/system. At higher granularity, 
the decision layer provides high-level commands that are broken down and executed by the 
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intelligent control capability of the functional layer. The decision layer provides 
functionality to break down goals into objectives, establish a sequential task ordering based 
on the plant/system state and known constraints, and assess the capability of the functional 
layer to implement those commands. At lower granularity within the decision layer, 
executive functions such as procedure enforcement are dominant while, at higher 
granularity, planning functions such as goal determination and strategy development are 
dominant. 
There is an architectural approach for nearly autonomous control systems that have been 
applied through simulated nuclear power applications (see Fig. 1). As part of research into 
advanced multi-modular nuclear reactor concepts, such as the International Reactor 
Innovative and Secure (IRIS) and the ALMR, a supervisory control system architecture was 
devised (Wood et al., 2004). This approach provides a framework for autonomous control 
while supporting a high-level interface with operations staff, who can act as plant 
supervisors. The final authority for decisions and goal setting remains with the human, but 
the control system assumes expanded responsibilities for normal control action, abnormal 
event response, and system fault tolerance. The autonomous control framework allows 
integration of controllers and diagnostics at the subsystem level with command and 
decision modules at higher levels. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Supervisory control architecture for multi-modular nuclear power plants 
The autonomous control system architecture is hierarchical and recursive. Each node in the 
hierarchy (except for the terminal nodes at the base) is a supervisory module. The 
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supervisory control modules at each level within the hierarchy respond to goals and 
directions set in modules above it and to data and information presented from modules 
below it. Each module makes decisions appropriate for its level in the hierarchy and passes 
the decision results and necessary supporting information to the functionally connected 
modules. 
The device network level consists of sensors, actuators, and communications links. The next 
highest level consists of control, surveillance, and diagnostic modules. The coupling of the 
control modules with the lower-level nodes is equivalent to an automated control system 
composed of controllers and field devices. The surveillance and diagnostic modules provide 
derived data to support condition determination and monitoring for components and 
process systems. The hybrid control level provides command and signal validation 
capabilities and supports prognosis of incipient failure or emerging component degradation 
(i.e., fault identification). The command level provides algorithms to permit reconfiguration 
or adaptation to accommodate detected or predicted plant conditions (i.e., active fault 
tolerance). For example, if immediate sensor failure is detected by the diagnostic modules 
and the corresponding control algorithm gives evidence of deviation based on command 
validation against pre-established diverse control algorithms, then the command module 
may direct that an alternate controller, which is not dependent on the affected measurement 
variable, be selected as principal controller. The actions taken at these lower levels can be 
constrained to predetermined configuration options implemented as part of the design. In 
addition, the capability to inhibit or reverse autonomous control actions based on operator 
commands can be provided. The highest level of the autonomous control architecture 
provides the link to the operational staff. 
3.2 Framework for autonomous control functionality 
A variation on the nuclear plant supervisory control architecture and the CLARAty 
architecture for microrovers seems appropriate for consideration as the framework to 
support autonomy for an SNPS control system. Figure 2 illustrates the concept. Essentially, 
the approach of a hierarchical distribution of supervisory control and diagnostic 
functionality throughout the control system structure is adopted, while the overlaid decision 
functionality is maintained. It is possible to blend the decision and functional layers for this 
application domain because the planning regime for nuclear power system operation is 
much more restricted than for robotic or spacecraft applications. For example, while there 
are a multitude of paths that a robot may traverse as it navigates to its next site, the states 
are allowed for an SNPS are much more constrained. Even in the event of transients or 
faults, the control system will try to drive the plant back to a known safe state. This 
compression of the dual layers into a truncated three-sided pyramid allows for a deeper 
integration of control, diagnostics, and decision to provide the necessary capability to 
respond to rapid events and to adapt to changing or degraded conditions.  
The granularity dimension is retained with more complexity shown at the lower hierarchical 
levels. Additionally, the information and command flow reflects granularity as well. At 
lower granularity, volumes of data are present. As the granularity increases moving up the 
hierarchy, the data are processed into system state and diagnostic/prognostic information 
that are subsequently refined into status and indicator information. On the command side, 
the transition from the top is demands to commands to control signals with the resolution of 
the plant/system control growing increasingly more detailed.  
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As with the supervisory control architecture, the bottom two levels of the hierarchy are the 
equivalent of an automated control system. The embedded functionality that enables a 
reliable, fault-tolerant implementation is indicated as a base intelligence. It is expected that 
there will be some decision capability associated with the control/surveillance/diagnostics 
level of that baseline system. The higher levels of the hierarchy assume greater degrees of 
decision capabilities.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Hierarchical framework to support SNPS control system autonomy 
In addition to managing the communications within the hierarchy, the autonomous control 
system must coordinate with the spacecraft control system and keep the mission control 
staff informed. To this end, the reactor supervisor/coordinator node must communicate 
information about the status of the SNPS and the control system and also receive directives 
and commands. The information provided by the supervisor node can include  
SNPS operational status and capability (e.g., constraints due to degradation), control action 
histories, diagnostic information, self-validation results, control system configuration,  
and data logs. Additional communication outside of the hierarchy may be required to 
coordinate control actions with other segments of the spacecraft, such as the power 
conversion system. 
The functionality that is embodied in the hierarchy can be decomposed into several 
elements. These include data acquisition, actuator activation, validation, arbitration, 
control, limitation, checking, monitoring, commanding, prediction, communication, fault 
management, and configuration management. The validation functionality can address 
signals, commands, and system performance. The arbitration functionality can address 
redundant inputs or outputs, commands from redundant or diverse controllers, and 
status indicators from various monitoring and diagnostic modules. The control 
functionality includes direct plant or system control and supervisory control of the SNPS 
control system itself. The limitation functionality involves maintaining plant conditions 
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within an acceptable boundary and inhibiting control system actions. The checking 
functionality can address computational results, input and output consistency, and 
plant/system response. The monitoring functionality includes status, response, and 
condition or health of the control system, components, and plant, and it provides 
diagnostic and prognostic information. The commanding functionality is directed toward 
configuration and action of lower level controllers and diagnostic modules. The 
prediction functionality can address identification of plant/system state, expected 
response to prospective actions, remaining useful life of components, and incipient 
operational events or failures. The communication functionality involves control and 
measurement signals to and from the field devices, information and commands within the 
control system, and status and demands between the SNPS control system and spacecraft 
or ground control. The fault management and configuration management functionalities 
are interrelated and depend on two principal design characteristics. These are the ability 
of the designer to anticipate a full range of faults and the degree of autonomy enabled by 
the control system design. 
Finally, the distribution of functions throughout the hierarchy must be established based on 
the degree of autonomy selected, technology readiness, reliability and fault management 
considerations, software development practices and platform capabilities, and the physical 
architecture of the SNPS control system hardware. Because an autonomous control system 
has never been implemented for a nuclear reactor and because several functional 
capabilities remain underdeveloped (as seen in the overview of the state of the art), there is 
clearly a critical need for further development and demonstration of a suitable architectural 
framework.  
4. Application of model-based control to Space Nuclear Power Systems 
Key functionality that is necessary to establish the basis for autonomous control has been 
demonstrated through a simulated space reactor application under university research 
sponsored by DOE. These capabilities related to control elements within the lower layers of 
the functional hierarchy. Specifically, the research conducted at UT involved development 
of a highly fault tolerant power controller for the SP-100 space power reactor design 
(Upadhyaya et al., 2007; Na & Upadhyaya, 2007).  
The SP-100 design provides for a fast spectrum, lithium-cooled fuel pin reactor coupled with 
thermo-electric converters (TE) with the waste heat removed through a heat pipe 
distribution system and space radiators. The TE generator output is rated at 112 kW, with a 
nominal reactor thermal power 2000 kW.  
A lumped parameter simulation of a representative SNPS was developed based  
on physics models specific to the SP-100 reactor, which were derived in prior academic 
work at the University of New Mexico (El-Genk & Seo, 1987). The reactor system modules 
include a model of reactor control mechanism, a neutron kinetics model, a reactor  
core heat transfer model, a primary heat exchanger (HX) model, and a TE conversion 
model. Figure 3 illustrates the elements of the SNPS model. The integrated SP-100  
SNPS model was assembled through an iterative algorithm. The model involves both 
nonlinear ordinary differential equations and partial differential equations. The code 
development was performed under the MATLAB™/SIMULINK™ environment. The 
SNPS simulation provided the demonstration platform for the fault tolerant controller 
development. 
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Fig. 3. Schematic of the model development of the SP-100 reactor system 
 
 
Fig. 4. Basic concept of a model predictive control method 
The control approach adopted is a model-predictive controller (MPC) design. The basic 
concept of the model-predictive control method is illustrated in Fig. 4. The MPC 
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minimizes a quadratic cost function and takes into consideration any constraints imposed 
on the control action and the state variables. For a given set of present and future control 
actions, the future behavior of the state variables are predicted over a prediction horizon 
N, and M present and future control moves (M ≤ N) are computed to minimize the 
quadratic objective function. Out of the M control moves that are calculated, only the first 
control action is implemented. The prediction feature of the controller has an anticipatory 
effect, and is reflected in the current control action. These calculations are repeated in the 
next time step by appending the next measurement to the database. The new 
measurements compensate for the unmeasured disturbances and model inaccuracies, both 
of which result in the measured system output being different from that predicted by the 
model. The MPC requires the on-line solution of an optimization problem to compute 
optimal control inputs over the time horizon. The MPC calculates a sequence of future 
control signals by minimizing a multi-stage cost function defined over a prediction 
horizon. 
The performance index for deriving an optimal control input is represented by the quadratic 
objective function given in Eq. (1). 
    2 2
1 1
1 1
ˆ( | ) ( ) ( 1)
2 2
N M
j j
J Q y t j t w t j R u t j
 
         , (1) 
subject to constraints   min max
max
( 1) 0  for  ,
( ) ,
( ) .
u t j j M
u u t u
u t u
         
 
where Q  and R  are the weights for the TE generator power (system output) error and 
the SP-100 control drum angle (reactivity as control input) change between time steps at 
certain future time intervals, respectively, and w  is a set point (desired generator power). 
The estimate ˆ( | )y t j t  is an optimum j -step-ahead prediction of the system output (TE 
generator power) based on data up to time t; that is, the expected value of the output at 
time t as a function of the past input and output and the future control sequence are 
known. N and M are the prediction horizon and the control horizon, respectively. The 
prediction horizon represents the limiting time for the output to follow the reference 
sequence. In order to obtain control inputs, the predicted outputs are first calculated as a 
function of past values of inputs and outputs. The constraint, ( 1) 0 foru t j j M     , 
indicates that there is no variation in the control signal after a certain time interval M < N, 
where M is the control horizon. minu  and maxu  are the minimum and maximum values of 
input, respectively, and maxu  is a maximum allowable control perturbation per time 
step. 
The applicability and the effectiveness of the MPC approach were demonstrated through its 
simulated performance for several operational scenarios, including under degraded or ill-
characterized conditions (Upadhyaya et al., 2007). The effectiveness of the MPC controller 
for tracking the TE power output is illustrated in Figure 6. Figure 6a shows the TE converter 
set point profile and the actual TE generator power. The corresponding reactivity changes 
(drum angle variations) are shown in Figure 6b.  
www.intechopen.com
 
An Approach to Autonomous Control for Space Nuclear Power Systems 
 
115 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
100
105
110
115
120
125
time(s)
E
le
c
tr
ic
 P
o
w
e
r 
( 
k
W
 )
actual electric power
setvalue of electric power
 
(a) 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
time(s)
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
D
ru
m
 A
n
g
le
 (
 D
e
g
re
e
 )
 
(b) 
Fig. 6. (a) Electric power (TE) set point profile and the controller performance. (b) Controller 
response (i.e., reactivity control) in terms of the drum angle 
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The MPC approach was shown to provide a fast response and robustness under changing 
system conditions. Specifically, fault tolerance and reconfigurability features of the control 
approach were demonstrated in response to sensor faults, drum actuator anomalies, and 
changes in model parameters (Upadhyaya et al., 2007; Na & Upadhyaya, 2007). 
Consequently, it is observed that several of the capabilities and characteristics that are 
necessary to enable autonomous control are provided by the MPC approach. 
5. Conclusion 
The control system for an SNPS will be subject to unique challenges as compared to 
terrestrial nuclear reactors, which employ varying degrees of human control and decision-
making for operations and benefit from periodic human interaction for maintenance. In 
contrast, the SNPS control system must be able to provide continuous, remote, often 
unattended operation for a mission lasting a decade or more with limited immediate human 
interaction and no opportunity for hardware maintenance. In addition to the inaccessibility 
and periods of unattended operation, the SNPS control system must accommodate severe 
environments, system and equipment degradation or failure, design uncertainties, and rare 
or unanticipated operational events during an extended mission life. As a result, the 
capability to respond to rapid events and to adapt to changing or degraded conditions 
without near-term human supervision is required to support mission goals. Autonomous 
control can satisfy essential control objectives under significant uncertainties, disturbances, 
and degradation without requiring any human intervention. Therefore, autonomous control 
is necessary to ensure the successful application of an SNPS for deep space missions.  
Key characteristics that are feasible through autonomous control include 
 intelligence to confirm system performance and detect degraded or failed conditions,  
 optimization to minimize stress on SNPS components and efficiently react to 
operational events without compromising system integrity,  
 robustness to accommodate uncertainties and changing conditions, and 
 flexibility and adaptability to accommodate failures through reconfiguration among 
available control system elements or adjustment of control system strategies, 
algorithms, or parameters.  
Autonomous control must be addressed early in the design of an SNPS to determine the 
degree of autonomy required. Mission requirements, design trade-offs, and the state of 
the technology will affect the autonomous capabilities to be included. The extent to which 
the key characteristics of autonomy are realized depends on the level of responsibility that 
is to be entrusted to the autonomous control system. Given anticipated mission 
imperatives to utilize technology with demonstrated (or at least high probability) 
readiness, it is not practical to strive for the high-end extreme of autonomy. Instead, 
modest advancement beyond fully automatic control to allow extended fault tolerance for 
anticipated events or degraded conditions and some predefined reconfigurability is the 
most realistic goal for an initial application of SNPS autonomous control. A hierarchical 
functional architecture providing integrated control, diagnostic, and decision capabilities 
that are distributed throughout the hierarchy can support this approach. The application 
of the MPC approach to the SP-100 reactor system and demonstration of key fault-tolerant 
and reconfigurable control features have been accomplished through simulation. The 
results illustrate the feasibility of incorporating these techniques in future space reactor 
designs. 
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Control systems with varying levels of autonomy have been employed in robotic, 
transportation, spacecraft, and manufacturing applications. However, autonomous control 
has not been implemented for an operating terrestrial nuclear power plant. Therefore, 
technology development and demonstration activities are needed to provide the desired 
technical readiness for implementation of an SNPS autonomous control system. In 
particular, the capabilities to monitor, trend, detect, diagnose, decide, and self-adjust must 
be established to enable control system autonomy. Finally, development and demonstration 
of a suitable architectural framework is also needed. 
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